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Is Law a Technical Language? 

FREDERICK SCHAUER* 
“Before rebushing the lower trunnion banjos, you must remove 
the bonnet fascia and undo the A-arm nut with a #3 spanner.”1 
I am reliably informed that the above quotation is in English.  But it is
far from obvious that the language of the quotation is the English that is 
spoken by ordinary English speakers, even those resident in the United 
Kingdom.  Rather, it appears to be an example of technical English, here 
a subset of the English presumably spoken and understood by those who 
are in the business of, or familiar with, repairing or performing maintenance
on the British cars of the 1950s and 1960s.  Yet even though the sentence is
an example of a technical language largely incomprehensible to those 
outside the relevant technical community, it does appear to be in English 
and not in Japanese, Swahili, or Esperanto. 
Therein lies the problem I seek to address on this occasion.  Of course 
law is replete with technical terms. Some of them announce their 
technicality by being in Latin, as with terms such as habeas corpus, res
ipsa loquitur, assumpsit, and quantum meruit. Other terms are equally
obviously technical because, although existing in something that looks 
like English, they have no ordinary uses.  Nonlawyers simply do not use 
* © 2015 Frederick Schauer.  David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor 
of Law, University of Virginia.  This Article is the written version of the Nathaniel L. 
Nathanson Memorial Lecture, delivered at the University of San Diego School of Law on
February 19, 2015. 
1. Don Hayward, The Laws for British Sports Cars, MOSS MOTORS NEWSL. (Moss 
Motors Ltd., Goleta, Cal.), Summer 1985 (quoting BRITISH MOTOR CORP., MGA SHOP
MANUAL 132 (1961)), http://www.brokenkitty.com/home/britcars.htm [http://perma.cc/ 
9YDJ-X5VS]. 
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terms like interpleader, covenant running with the land, letters rogatory, 
deposition, or desuetude. And still other terms resemble ordinary words, 
but have meanings in law that appear to diverge sharply from at least some 
of their ordinary language meanings, as with contract,2 party, witness, and 
even speech.3 
All competent lawyers are no doubt familiar with what we call “terms 
of art,” and for a lawyer to suggest that the meaning of actual malice4 or 
substantial evidence5 could be found by looking in Webster’s dictionary 
would be ample evidence of professional incompetence.6  But implicit in 
the view that certain legal terms are terms of art is the corollary—that 
most legal terms are not terms of art, and are therefore to be understood 
in a nontechnical or nonspecialized sense. But is this true? My agenda 
on this occasion is to examine the extent to which legal language—all of
it, and not just the epiphenomenal corner we designate as terms of art—is 
a specialized language demanding interpretation in light of the particular 
goals of a legal system.
It is not my intention here to offer strong—or even weak—normative 
conclusions about the issue I propose to analyze.  But if I can succeed in 
raising an issue that is often ignored, I will consider this lecture a success. 
Yet as will become apparent, one application of the question whether law 
is a technical language is in supporting a skeptical view about the now-
common distinction between interpretation and construction.  For many
years, first in the literature on the interpretation of contracts,7 then in 
2. On contract as a technical term—or not—see Mary Jane Morrison, Excursions 
into the Nature of Legal Language, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 271 (1989), an important but 
unfortunately neglected article on the circumstances under which legal language is or is 
not to be treated as technical language.  Also highly valuable, although more narrowly
focused on the parol evidence rule, is PETER M. TIERSMA, PARCHMENT PAPER PIXELS: LAW
AND THE TECHNOLOGIES OF COMMUNICATION 116–31 (2010). 
3. On speech in the First Amendment as a technical term, see Morrison, supra note 
2, at 321–35; Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An
Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899 (1979);
Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, The 
Boundaries of the First Amendment]; Peter Meijes Tiersma, Nonverbal Communication
and the Freedom of “Speech,” 1993 WIS. L. REV. 1525 (1993). 
4.  Cantrell v. Forest City Publ’g Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251 (1974). 
5.  T-Mobile S., LLC v. City of Roswell, 135 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2015). 
6.  And this is even truer of those terms that are constitutive, in the sense that they
mark an institution or idea that is created by law and not simply regulated by it. Trust and
corporation seem like good examples.  On law’s constitutive dimension, see the summary
in FREDERICK SCHAUER, THE FORCE OF LAW 27–31 (2015). 
7. The leading article is Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of
Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964). See also E. Allan Farnsworth, “Meaning” in
the Law of Contracts, 76 YALE L.J. 939, 940 (1967) (distinguishing contract construction 
from contract interpretation).  Insofar as the distinction between interpretation and 
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discussions of statutory interpretation,8 and these days especially in the
debates about constitutional originalism,9 it is often claimed that
determining legal meaning and applying that meaning to particular cases 
and controversies is a two-step process. The first step—interpretation— 
is the step in which the lawyer, judge, or commentator determines what 
some piece of legal language simply means. This is, it is said, a semantic 
enterprise, where we are trying to determine, in the abstract, what some 
word or phrase means according to the rules and practices by which we 
determine meaning in everyday life.  But having determined the meaning 
of some item of legal language—having interpreted it—the lawyer or
judge or commentator must then apply it in the resolution of the particular 
legal matter at hand.  This, it is said, is the process of construction, and it
is an inevitably legal task drawing on legal tools, legal ideas, and legal goals,
without which the process of construction will fail to serve the institutional 
aims of a legal system.
The distinction between interpretation and construction, however, 
presupposes a distinction between a principally nonlegal or pre-legal
focus in the interpretation stage followed by a legally infused process at
the construction stage. But to the extent that legal language is itself a 
technical language, legal ideals and aims come in at the interpretation
stage and not just at the later point of construction.  Consequently, 
identifying even the possibility that legal language may be a pervasively 
technical language has the potential for seriously undercutting the 
ubiquitous interpretation–construction distinction.  Or so I shall suggest 
on this occasion. 
construction in the contracts context arises from language produced by the contracting
parties, it bears an affinity with the same issue arising from claimant-produced language 
in the patent context.  See Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-
Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530 (2013). 
8. See Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative 
Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2014). 
9. See  KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 3–9 (1999); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2–14
(1999); Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
65 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM. L.  
REV. 453 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation–Construction Distinction, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
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The issue I address here can usefully be highlighted by contrasting two
diametrically opposed views about the possibility that legal language might
pervasively be a technical language understood only by those steeped in 
the law and knowledgeable about its techniques. And at one pole of this 
opposition we find Jeremy Bentham, for whom the very idea that legal 
language could be considered as technical or specialized was anathema. 
Bentham, as is well-known, was a vehement—which might put it too 
mildly—critic of the English law of his time, and of the common law even
more generally.10  And because his ire was based substantially on the view
that lawyers and judges were participants in a conspiracy—Judge & Co.11— 
to make law unnecessarily complex for the purpose of increasing the income
of lawyers and the power of judges, he became especially incensed about 
the frequency with which legal language diverged from ordinary usage.12 
This divergence was frequently manifested in the phenomenon of the 
legal fiction—the use in law of propositions that are not literally true but 
which achieve what the law generally or some legal actor believes to be 
the legally desirable result.13 
Among the classic examples of legal fictions is the presumption of 
paternity, by which the husband of a mother is presumed to be the father 
of a child born during the marriage, even though, as a biological matter, 
he might not be.14 Similarly, there is the fiction of corporate personhood,
 10. See generally GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
207–17, 266–311 (1986) (describing and analyzing Bentham’s critique of the common
law). 
11. 6 JEREMY BENTHAM, An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence, in THE 
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 5, 22–24 (John Bowring ed., 1843). 
12. Bentham’s views about legal fictions were part of a larger project partly about 
law, but also partly about language generally.  See C.K. OGDEN, BENTHAM’S THEORY OF 
FICTIONS (1932); see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Bentham’s Theory of Fictions—A
“Curious Double Language,” 11 CARDOZO STUD. L.  &  LITERATURE 223 (1999) (discussing
Bentham’s critique of legal fictions). 
13. On legal fictions generally, see LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
(Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twining eds., 2015); Louise Harmon, Falling Off the 
Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 1 (1990); 
Nancy J. Knauer, Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth, 23 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 1 (2010); Eben 
Moglen, Legal Fictions and Common Law Legal Theory: Some Historical Reflections, 10
TEL AVIV UNIV. STUD. L. 33 (1990).  The classic work remains LON L. FULLER, LEGAL
FICTIONS (1967), about which much more will be said in the following section. 
14. See Succession of Cosse, 608 So. 2d 1092, 1097–98 (La. Ct. App. 1992) 
(describing presumption of paternity as a legal fiction); Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 
180 (Pa. 1997) (same); Jacqulyn A. West, Comment, Maintaining the Legal Fiction:
Application of the Presumption of Paternity and Paternity by Estoppel in Pennsylvania, 
42 DUQ. L. REV. 577, 577 (2004). 
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although corporations are not persons in any literal sense,15 the fiction 
declaring juvenile trespassers to be invitees, even though they were 
decidedly not invited onto the premises,16 the fiction that a joint owner of
property who kills the other joint owner has predeceased the victim,17 and 
the fiction underlying the doctrine of ejectment, which allows courts to try
the title to land even though no one has been ejected from anything.18  And 
perhaps most famous is the fiction in Mostyn v. Fabrigas,19 in which Lord 
Mansfield declared the Mediterranean island of Minorca to be in London 
so as to take jurisdiction under a statute limiting jurisdiction to cases in
which the claimant was a resident of London.20 
An essential feature of a legal fiction is that the very fictionality of a 
legal fiction is based on the literal untruth of the fiction.  The presumption of
paternity is a fiction because the husband is deemed a father even if he is 
not, just as corporate personhood is a fiction because corporations are not
persons. As a result, the individual unlearned in the law, and thus inclined
to read the law literally, would not be able to understand that when law 
said person it did not really mean person in the ordinary literal sense and
when the law said father it meant something other than what laypeople 
meant by father in their everyday talk.  The legal fiction thus exemplified
all—or at least most—of what Bentham despised about law, because a 
legal fiction would obscure true legal meaning from someone not versed
in the law. 
For Bentham the ubiquitous legal practice of using fictions of this type 
to achieve what lawyers or judges thought was an equitable or just result
was despicable.  And lest there be any doubt about Bentham’s feelings 
about legal fictions and thus about the way in which legal language frequently
diverged from ordinary language, consider the following articulation of
 15. See Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: the Language of a Legal 
Fiction, 61 TUL. L.  REV. 563, 563 (1987). 
16. See FULLER, supra note 13, at 66. 
17. In re Sparks’ Estate, 15 N.Y.S.2d 926, 931 (Sur. Ct. 1939). 
18. See  JOHN H. LANGBEIN, RENÉE LETTOW LERNER & BRUCE P. SMITH, HISTORY 
OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 252
(2009). 
19.  (1774) 98 Eng. Rep. 1021; 1 Cowp. 160. 
20. Id. at 1026, 1030; 1 Cowp. at 170, 176–77.  Lest the audience suppose that legal 
fictions are a thing of the past, see Roderick Munday, The Bridge That Choked a
Watercourse or Repetitive Dictionary Disorder, 29 STATUTE L. REV. 26, 26–28 (2008), 
describing the case of R v. Torridge Dist. Council [2006] EWHC (Admin) 877; [2006] 3
All ER 1148 (Eng.). 
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his view about the fundamental dishonesty of the legal fiction: “Every
criminal uses the weapon he is most practiced in the use of: the bull uses 
his horns, the tiger his claws, the rattle-snake his fangs, the technical 
lawyer his lies.  Unlicensed thieves use pick-lock keys: licensed thieves 
use fictions.”21  And at other times he observed that “[I]n English law, 
fiction is a syphilis, which runs in every vein, and carries into every part
of the system the principle of rottenness.”22  Or that “the pestilential breath 
of Fiction poisons the sense of every instrument it comes near.”23 
Behind Bentham’s invective was a serious point.  For Bentham the 
audience for law was not judges, nor was it other lawyers. Rather, the
audience, or at least the principal audience,24 for law was the public whose 
behavior was to be guided or controlled.  If lawmakers, who for Bentham 
resided ideally in the legislature and not on the bench, could issue law’s 
directives in a way that those being directed would have no need for
lawyers to advise them and judges to determine what the language meant,
then the corrupting influence of the legal profession would be eliminated,
and law’s unnecessary complexity could be reduced or even eliminated. 
Accordingly, when Bentham, with his tongue decidedly not in his cheek,25 
suggested that it might be made unlawful for people to give legal advice 
for money,26 his goal was to remove the incentive from Parliament to help 
lawyers, who were well represented in Parliament, by making law 
increasingly complex.
Bentham’s excoriation of legal fictions was thus merely one aspect of
his larger desire for law to be understood by ordinary people without the 
intervention of lawyers and the interpretation of judges.  As a result, the 
very idea of legal language as technical language stands opposed to
Bentham’s visions, and we can therefore take Bentham as the exemplar of
the view that legal language, at least ideally if not in reality in Bentham’s
time, should be understood as plain, everyday, ordinary language and not 
as the specialized discourse of a specialized profession. 
21. 4 JEREMY BENTHAM, Thirteenth Device—Fiction, in  RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL
EVIDENCE 300, 307–08 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1995) (1827). 
22. 5 BENTHAM, The Elements of the Art of Packing, supra note 11, at 65, 92. 
23. 1 BENTHAM, A Fragment on Government; or a Comment on the Commentaries, 
supra note 11, at 221, 235 n.s. 
24. Bentham did recognize that law was at times aimed at the officials and not 
directly at the public, although we might suspect that he wished it were otherwise. On
law’s two audiences in just this sense, see especially Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626–27 
(1984). 
25. Which apparently it never was: “Bentham was not gifted with a strong sense of
humor . . . .” GEOFFREY TREASURE, WHO’S WHO IN LATE HANOVERIAN BRITAIN: 1789– 
1837, at 56 (Stackpole Books 2002) (1997). 
26. 5 BENTHAM, Scotch Reform, supra note 11, at 1, 5–6. 
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II. 
If Bentham can serve as the model for one pole of what is plainly a 
spectrum and not a dichotomy, then at the other pole we can place Lon
Fuller. In the course of writing sympathetically about legal fictions,27 
Fuller explicitly discussed the divergence between legal language as 
ordinary language and legal language as technical language, and, albeit 
with some number of qualifications, suggested that law advances to the 
extent that it develops its own language and to the extent that its language is
understood in a technical or specialized sense rather than an ordinary
28one.
Fuller’s sympathy for the idea that all or most of legal language should be
understood in a law-specific sense, despite nonlegal connotations, is 
apparent from his other writings.  Thus, in famously debating with H.L.A. 
Hart about how a “No Vehicles in the Park” rule should be interpreted,29 
and in challenging Hart’s claim that the rule had a core of settled meaning 
determinable by reference to the plain—and nontechnical—meaning of 
the language of the rule, Fuller appeared to suggest, although somewhat 
obliquely, that what counted as a vehicle in ordinary language might still
not be a vehicle when understood as part of a legal rule.30  To the extent
that he was making that claim, Fuller can be understood as arguing that
all of legal language is technical language and that to try to interpret law 
without understanding this important fact is to make a fundamental 
mistake.  Indeed, much the same suggestion appears in the voice of Justice 
Foster—who is almost certainly Fuller himself—in Fuller’s enduring 
“Case of the Speluncean Explorers.”31  For Justice Foster, the legal meaning 
of a legal rule was not the literal meaning as perceived by the layperson, 
but rather was a “meaning that is not at once apparent to the casual reader
 27. FULLER, supra note 13. 
28. Id. at 11–27. 
29. Lon L. Fuller, Response, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor 
Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630, 661–69 (1958); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation 
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 606–15 (1958); see generally Frederick 
Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1109 (2008)
(examining the “most famous hypothetical in the common law world”). 
30. Fuller, supra note 29, at 663.  A far more sophisticated version of the claim is 
in Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 
381–96 (1985). 
31. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L.  REV. 616, 
620–26 (1949). 
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who has not studied the statute closely or examined the objectives it seeks 
to attain.”32 
Fuller’s concerns with the problems of understanding legal language as 
ordinary language are by no means unique to him. In an unpublished 
speech entitled Law and Language, Karl Llewellyn recognized that much 
of the language of law was appropriately divergent from ordinary 
language and thus suggested that there might even be something like a 
Committee on Translation to enable disciplines to understand each other.33 
Similarly, the contracts, insurance law, and jurisprudence scholar Edwin 
Patterson, in an unfinished and unpublished treatise on contract law, 
lamented the fact that much confusion was sown by the way in which the
language of contract law resembled, but was not identical to in terms of 
meaning, the language of ordinary English.34  And thus, he proposed, only 
half seriously, that the word contract be replaced by a term unique in the 
law, such as spikbond, and that similarly confusing terms such as offer 
and acceptance be discarded in favor of terms from Roman law that had 
no ordinary English meaning, such as spondesne and spondeo.35  And  
finally, Oliver Wendell Holmes lamented that the words of law had
confusing moral connotations, and he too suggested that law might be 
better off were such confusions to be eliminated: 
For my own part, I often doubt whether it would not be a gain if every word of 
moral significance could be banished from the law altogether, and other words
adopted which should convey legal ideas uncolored by anything outside the law.  
We should lose the fossil records of a good deal of history and the majesty got from
ethical associations, but by ridding ourselves of an unnecessary confusion we
should gain very much in the clearness of our thought.36 
The view of Fuller, Llewellyn, Patterson, Holmes, and others thus 
stands at the opposite pole from Bentham’s position.  For the former group, 
law is a technical, specialized discipline, with its own history and its own 
goals.37  And although law must for them be written in something that
 32. Id. at 625. 
33. Karl N. Llewellyn, Law and Language 23–24 (May 1961) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the D’Angelo Law Library, University of Chicago). 
34. Edwin W. Patterson, Treatise on the Law of Contracts ch. 3 (unpublished and
undated manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law School Library). 
35. Id. at ch. 3, § 18.  Patterson also discussed legal technical language in 
JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 252–58 (1953). 
36. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 
(1897). 
37. I do not claim that Fuller and others ignored the importance of law speaking
plainly when it is speaking to ordinary people, as with, for example, jury instructions.  See 
Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reforming the Language of Jury Instructions, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
37 (1993). 
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resembles ordinary English,38 the existence of technical terms in law and 
the existence of technical meanings of ordinary words in law is more 
something to be celebrated than lamented, more to be fostered than stifled.
To see legal language as technical language is to understand law’s complexity,
to understand law’s goals, and to appreciate the way in which law has
developed to facilitate those goals.  And because law operates with and
through language, it would be unfortunate, they appear to believe, if the
desire to make law more publicly accessible were to become the vehicle 
to make law less responsive to the functions it has been created and 
developed to serve. 
III. 
Obviously my contrast between Bentham and Fuller and others is more 
than a trifle exaggerated. To repeat, the distinction between legal language
as ordinary language and legal language as technical language is much
more a spectrum than a dichotomy, more scalar than polar.  Nevertheless,
it does represent a genuine issue that pervades all of law.  In Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., for example, Justice O’Connor, writing 
for a Supreme Court majority, understood the terms “any national currency” 
and “gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths” in
Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention as essentially technical terms to be
interpreted in light of the broad purposes of the Warsaw Convention itself.39 
Justice Stevens, in an angry dissent, complained that much of the very idea of
law itself is jeopardized when courts assume that the words of law mean
something other than what they seem straightforwardly and nontechnically 
to mean.40 
Similarly, many of the debates about the proper interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment41 can be seen as debates
about whether the phrase “confronted with the witnesses against him” 
38. A valuable but inconclusive series of reflections on the puzzling relationship
between ordinary language and technical language is Charles E. Caton, Introduction to 
PHILOSOPHY AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE, at v (Charles E. Caton ed., 1963).  For Caton, 
although perhaps not for Fuller, Patterson, and Holmes, “technical language is always an
adjunct of ordinary language.” Id. at viii.
39. 466 U.S. 243, 247, 256 (1984) (quoting Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, art. 22, Oct. 12, 1929, 49
Stat. 3000). 
40. Id. at 261, 282 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
41. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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should be understood as ordinary or technical language,42 just as 
longstanding debates about the compatibility of obscenity law with the
First Amendment have been framed in terms of whether speech should be 
understood as ordinary language or instead as a technical term whose 
extensions vary from those of ordinary usage.43  More recently, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in NLRB v. Noel Canning,44 dealing with the definition 
of recess in Article I of the Constitution, considered not only whether the
term recess should be given its ordinary or technical meaning, but even
whether the word the might be understood in ways other than how it might
be understood by the ordinary person on the street. And, most recently of
all, in determining whether a fish was a tangible object for purposes of the 
antishredding—and thus antidestruction of evidence—provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley securities law amendments,45 the Supreme Court was forced 
to decide whether tangible object meant what it would mean in ordinary
language, in which case it would include a fish destroyed in order to
prevent its use as evidence, or whether it too was a technical term whose 
meaning was derived from the statute of which it was a part, a statute that 
had nothing to do with fish or any of the laws preventing the taking of 
undersize fish from federal waters.46 
IV. 
Although the issue of whether legal language should be interpreted as 
ordinary or technical language is thus all around us, it has a particular 
42. Compare Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42–43, 51–52 (2004) (holding that
although “one could plausibly read ‘witnesses against’ a defendant to mean those who 
actually testify at trial,” the Confrontation Clause applies not only to in-court, but also to 
out-of-court statements), with Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) (applying the literal 
language of the clause would result in a result “unintended and too extreme”), abrogated 
by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69. See also Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 370 (2011)
(examining “the statements and actions of the parties to the encounter” in determining if 
there was an interrogation); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 309–11
(2009) (testimony includes affidavits based on their evidentiary purpose); Giles v. 
California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008) (testimony does not include an exception for “forfeiture 
by wrongdoing”); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006) (applying the colloquial 
sense of interrogation to hold statements assisting police in addressing an ongoing
emergency are not testimonial).
 43. Compare Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment, supra note 3, at 
1773–75 (discussing how the ordinary language meaning of the word speech cannot 
plausibly delineate the boundaries of the First Amendment), with Eugene Volokh, Speech as
Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering
Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277 (2005) (criticizing
overly technical definitions of speech). 
44.  134 S. Ct. 2550, 2560–61 (2014). 
45.  18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). 
46.  Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
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importance for some current debates about the theory and practice of 
constitutional interpretation.  As I observed earlier,47 a persistent theme in 
many of these debates is that there is an important distinction between the 
activity of interpretation, the stage at which a court—or advocate— 
determines what some provision means, and the stage of construction, the
stage at which the court applies that meaning to the particular
controversy at hand.  And at least one purpose of drawing the distinction 
is to suggest that interpreting the Constitution in an originalist manner,
say, still leaves open the question as to how the original public meaning 
of some provision should be applied—constructed—to the matter at hand. 
Implicit in the interpretation–construction distinction, however, is the 
view that the meaning of the relevant terms can be determined without 
taking into account how they might actually be applied within the legal 
system and to a particular controversy involving a particular set of facts. 
But for Fuller, among others, the former task cannot be separated from the 
latter. If we understand all of legal language as incorporating law’s goals,
law’s values, and law’s purposes, then the very act of determining 
meaning, as with the meaning of vehicle or recess or tangible object, must 
take account not only of the fact that such words exist in legal rules or 
legal documents, and not only that they are being interpreted by a court, 
but also of the outcomes that one or another interpretation would produce. 
For Fuller, at the very least, to interpret legal language without being 
aware of the consequences, within law, of one interpretation or another 
was to fail to understand the nature of legal language and the very nature 
of law. 
At the very least, therefore, we suspect that Fuller would have had little 
patience for the interpretation—construction distinction.48  But the question
is not whether Fuller was right. Indeed, those of us with sympathies for the
idea of legal language being understood literally and acontextually believe
that Fuller was mistaken.49  Rather, the question is that of locating the point
in the adjudication process at which an advocate or a judge determines
 47. See supra text accompanying notes 7–10. 
48. Although this is only a suspicion, it is worth noting the plainly Fullerian 
observation that the interpretation–construction distinction in contract law might collapse 
if meaning is understood to include the circumstances of application.  See David V. 
Snyder, Language and Formalities in Commercial Contracts: A Defense of Custom and
Conduct, 54 SMU L. REV. 617, 617 n.3 (2001). 
49. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 53–76 (1991); Frederick Schauer, 
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). 
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whether Fuller was correct or incorrect.  Or, to put it differently, when in the
process of deciding a case does the judge determine whether the language 
she is called upon to apply is to be understood as ordinary or technical
language, and, if the latter, just what does it mean to say that a word has 
a legal meaning that diverges from its ordinary meaning?  If a word has a 
legal meaning, and if to have a legal meaning entails a meaning that
incorporates law’s goals and purposes, then law—in its full breadth and 
depth—intrudes on the process at the first stage and cannot be held in 
abeyance until some supposed second stage of construction.  So even if a 
judge believes that Fuller was mistaken and believes as well that some
term should be understood without reference to the consequences that some
particular application of that term would produce, the judge must make
that determination at the outset.  So whether the judge believes that Fuller
was correct, in which case issues of application arise in the interpretation 
stage, or that Fuller was incorrect, in which case issues of application can 
be delayed, the judge must still resolve this question at the outset. And this 
means that every interpretation of a legal item, whether it be a contract or a 
statute or a provision of the Constitution, involves the choice whether the
term to be interpreted is ordinary or technical, and, if the latter, just what 
it is for a term to have a technical legal meaning. 
The collapse of the interpretation–construction distinction, which I have 
just nondefinitively suggested, would not exist if it were the case that all
terms in law were to be understood as ordinary language and thus without 
regard to the circumstances or consequences of their legal application. And
although Jeremy Bentham might well have applauded such a state of 
affairs, it is not the law we have.  We have a law that at the very least
includes some technical terms, even if we acknowledge, contra Fuller, 
that many of the terms of law are in no way technical.  But as long as at
least some terms are technical, then any interpretive act within law will 
have to confront at the outset whether the term to be interpreted is one of
those terms.  And as long as that is so, believing that we can delay the 
consideration of legal applications and the nature of legal interpretation 
until some second stage in the process is either to make a mistake about 
the very nature of the process or at least is to assume, controversially, that 
the terms to be interpreted should be interpreted as ordinary language. This
is a conclusion that Bentham, and maybe I, would endorse, but it may be 
more of a commitment than most of the proponents of the interpretation– 
construction distinction seem willing at this point in the debates to
acknowledge. 
512 










     
  
[VOL. 52:  501, 2015] Is Law a Technical Language? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
V.
 
Although I believe that the collapse of the interpretation—construction 
distinction follows from some of what I have argued here, that conclusion is, 
at least for me, decidedly secondary.  Far more important is recognition of
the importance of the question of technical language in law and of the 
relationship between that question and the purposes of and audiences for
law. If we are to understand what law is and how it operates, we need to 
understand to whom it speaks.  If it speaks to everyone, as Bentham urged, 
then technical language in law is something to be lamented and expunged.
But if law is substantially the internal dialogue of a professional culture with
public goals but a nonpublic way of achieving them, then seeing law as a 
largely technical language, as Fuller and Holmes urged, is the natural 
corollary.  I cannot resolve this tension on this occasion, but I can, at the
very least, suggest that the entire subject of law as, possibly, a technical
language needs much more attention than it has received to date. 
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